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CRIMINAL LAW
PUBLIC SERVICE: SELF-INCRIMINATION VS. THE PUBLIC'S
RIGHT TO AN ACCOUNTING
JOEL M. FLAUM* AN JAYNE A. CARRt
Can the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination so cloak a public employee that he
can refuse to account for the performance of his
official duties? In recent years this issue has become
more significant as the number of investigations
into the conduct of those entrusted with public
responsibilities has increased.
The fifth amendment anti-incrimination privi-
lege, which is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment,' protects an individual
from being "compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself." 2 This protection under-
pins the accusatorial system of justice. "Govern-
ments, state and federal, are thus constitutionally
compelled to establish guilt by evidence inde-
pendently and freely secured, and may not by
coercion prove a charge against an accused out of
his own mouth."' The importance of the privilege
and the policies which it serves are universally
recognized.
The privilege against self-incrimination-the es-
sential mainstay of our adversary system-is
founded on a complex of values. All these policies
point to one overriding thought: the constitutional
foundation underlying the privilege is the respect
a government-state or federal-must accord to
the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To main-
tain a fair state-individual balance, to require the
government to shoulder the entire load, to respect
the inviolability of the human personality, our ac-
cusatory system of criminal justice demands that
the government seeking to punish an individual
produce the evidence against him by its own inde-
* J.D., 1963, L.L.M., 1964, Northwestern University;
Member', Illinois Bar; First Assistant United States
Attorney, Northern District of Illinois.
t J.D., 1970, Northwestern University; Member,
Illinois Bar; Assistant Attorney General, State of Illi-
nois, Criminal Justice Division.
The views expressed herein are not necessarily those
of either the United States Department of Justice or
the Attorney General of the State of Illinois.
1Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. at 8.
pendent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple
expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.
In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the per-
son is guaranteed the right to remain silent 'unless
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of
his own will.' 4
The privilege may be asserted in any proceed-
ing-civil or criminal, administrative or judicial,
investigatory or adjudicatory 5 -in response to any
question which the witness reasonably believes
requires an answer which may be self-incrimina-
tory.6 As a mainstay of our legal system, the privi-
lege must be accorded a liberal construction in
favor of the right it was intended to secure.
7 A
person's decision to testify or remain silent must
be the result of an "unfettered excercise of his
own will." 8 The invocation of the privilege cannot
be discouraged by the imposition of any 'penalty'
for its assertion. 9
Special problems arise when a government em-
ployer suspects an employee of performing his
official duties in a manner which is not only un-
satisfactory but perhaps in violation of law. A
public employer ordinarily would be able to com-
pel an accounting from the employee, and if his
suspicions are well founded, to discharge him.l
However, if the employee is performing his duties
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
5 Kastigar v. United States, 92 S.Ct. 1653 (1972);
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
6 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,486 (1951);
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
7 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
8 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. at 8.
9 See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614
(1964), forbidding a prosecutor to comment on a de-
fendant's failure to testify in a criminal case and elimi-
nating the use of a jury instruction to the effect that
such failure may be considered as evidence of the de-
fendant's guilt. See also Brooks v. Tennessee, 92 S.Ct.
1891 (1972)
10 See Schlochower v. Board of Higher Education,
350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956); Adler v. Board of Education
of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v.
Board of Public Works of City of Los Angles, 341 U.S.
716 (1951).
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in violation of law, the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination would seem to preclude
the employer from successfully demanding an
accounting, because the employee could reasonably
fear that information obtained from the account-
ing could later be used against him in a criminal
proceeding.
Through a series of decisions, the Supreme Court
of the United States has begun to evolve a workable
procedure by which the interests of both the public
and the employee are protected.
In Spevack v. Klein," decided in 1967, Spevack,
a New York attorney, refused to produce financial
records and refused to testify in a disciplinary
proceeding instituted against him for professional
misconduct. His refusals were grounded solely upon
the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. Spevack was disbarred by the
New York authorities on the theory that the fifth
amendment privilege was unavailable to an attor-
ney in a professional disciplinary proceeding.
The Supreme Court reversed the order of dis-
barment, concluding that the self-incrimination
clause "extends its protections to lawyers as well
as to other individuals, and that it should not be
watered down by imposing the dishonor of dis-
barment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a
price for asserting it." 12 The Court concluded that
disbarment constituted a penalty for the assertion
of the privilege in that it rendered Spevack's de-
cision to remain silent "costly."
The Spevack decision was accompanied by
another opinion delivered the same day. In Garrity
v. New Jersey,8 Garrity and the other appellants
were municipal police officers in New Jersey at the
time the state supreme court ordered the New
Jersey Attorney General to investigate alleged
fixing of traffic tickets in the state's municipal
courts. The appellants were questioned during
this investigation. Prior to the questioning, each
was warned that he had the right to remain silent
and that anything which he said could be used
against him in a criminal proceeding. Each was
further warned that a refusal to answer the in-
vestigator's questions would subject him to dis-
missal. None of the men were granted immunity,
but each answered the propounded questions.
Their answers were then used to convict them of
conspiracy to obstruct the administration of the
traffic laws. These convictions were challenged on
U 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
12 Id. at 514.
385 U.S. 493 (1967).
the basis that the answers were the product of
coercion, i.e. the threat of losing their jobs.
The Court found, as in Spevack, that the threat
of job forfeiture was coercive,"' and held that
"the protection of the individual under the Four-
teenth Amendment against coerced statements
prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings
of statements obtained under threat of removal
from office, and that it extends to all, whether
they are policemen or other members of our body
politic."' 5
In Spevackl and Garrity the Court had been
concerned primarily with the fifth amendment
rights of public servants as private individuals
and with fashioning a remedy for a violation of
those rights. The Court concluded that public
servants have no less standing under the fifth
amendment than do private citizens. In two sub-
sequent decisions, the Court directed its attention
to the effect which these rights have upon the
disciplinary powers of government employers.
In Gardner v. Broderick,7 a former New York
City policeman sought reinstatement and back
pay alleging that he was dismissed for refusing to
waive his fifth amendment privilege. Gardner had
been subpoenaed and had appeared before a county
grand jury investigating police corruption. He was
advised that he would be questioned concerning
the performance of his official duties and that the
fifth amendment privilege was available to him.
He was then asked to sign a waiver of immunity
after being informed that his failure to sign the
waiver would result in his dismissal. Gardner
14The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit
their jobs or to incriminate themselves. The op-
tion to lose their means of livelihood or to pay
the penalty of self incrimination is the antithesis
of free choice to speak out or remain silent.
Id., at 497.
16 Id. at 500.
16 It should be noted that the Spetack decision in-
involved proceedings to discipline a lawyer, while sub-
sequent decisions of the Court have involved non-
lawyers. There is some attempt to distinguish lawyers,
who are licensed by the state but who owe a large mea-
sure of loyalty to persons other than the licensor, from
other public officials whose loyalty should be undivided.
See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277-78 (1968);
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511; 516 n.3 (1967); id. at
519-20 (Fortas, J., concurring).
However, it should be noted that there is no apparent
reason for failing to apply the same piinciples to law-
yers as well as public servants, see Spevack v. Klein,
385 U.S. at 530-31 (White, J., dissenting), while keeping
in mind that there may be alternative bases for a law-
yer's silence, depending upon whether the information
requested from him involves matters protected by the
attorney-client privilege.
1392 U.S. 273 (1968).
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refused to sign the waiver. He received an ad-
ministrative hearing and was discharged solely for
his refusal to waive immunity' 8 His petition for
reinstatement was denied by the state courts.
The Supreme Court found the attempt to coerce
Gardner into waiving his immunity by threatening
to dismiss him from the police force to be an un-
constitutional infringement of the fifth amend-
ment privilege. In support of this conclusion, the
Court noted that Gardner's grand jury testimony
was demanded for subsequent use in a criminal
prosecution of him and not solely for the purpose
of demanding an accounting of the performance
of his official duties. 9 In such a situation, the Con-
stitution will not tolerate the attempt to secure,
through the use of threats of dismissal as a tool of
coercion, both an accounting of an employee's
performance of his official duties and evidence to
be used against the employee in a subsequent
criminal prosecution. However, the Court did
note that:
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer
questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relat-
ing to the performance of his official duties, without
being required to waive his immunity with respect
to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a
criminal prosecution of himself, Garrity v. State of
New Jersey, supra, the privilege against self-in-
crimination would not have been a bar to his dis-
missal.20
This conclusion was reemphasized in a decision
rendered by the Court on the same day as the
Gardner opinion. In Uniform Sanitation Men
Association v. Commissioner of Sanitationy an the
8New York City discharged him for refusal to ex-
ecute a document purporting to waive his con-
stitutional rights and to permit prosecution of
himself on the basis of his compelled testimony.
Petitioner could not have assumed-and cer-
tainly he was not required to assume-that was
being asked to do an idle act of no legal effect.
In any event, the mandate of the great privilege
against self-incrimination does not tolerate the
attempt, regardless of its ultimate effectiveness,
to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on
penalty of loss of employment.
392 U.S. at 279.
1 It is clear that petitioner's testimony was de-
manded before the grand jury in part so that
it might be used to prosecute him, and not solely
for the purpose of receiving an accounting of his
performance of his public trust. If the latter had
been the only purpose, there would have been
no reason to seek to compel petitioner to waive
his immunity.
Id. at 279.
10 Id. at 278.
21392 U.S. 280 (1968).
Court held that the fifth amendment privilege was
violated by the discharge of city employees who
refused to sign waivers of immunity when called
to testify befoxe a grand jury or who invoked the
privilege in an administrative proceeding after
being advised that their answers could be used
against them in a criminal proceeding.
Petitioners were not discharged merely for refusal
to account for their conduct as employees of the
city. They were dismissed for invoking and refusing
to waive their constitutional right against self- in-
crimination. They were discharged for refusal to
expose themselves to criminal prosecution based
on testimony which they would give under com-
pulsion, despite their constitutional privilege.2
The Court reiterated its statement in Gardner
that if an employee's right to immunity is not at
stake he may be compelled to account for his
performance of official duties upon pain of dis-
missal, and concluded:
[P]etitioners, being public employees, subject them-
selves to dismissal if they refuse to account for their
performance of their public trust, after proper pro-
ceedings, which do not involve an attempt to coerce
them to relinquish their constitutional rights.n
In Gardner and Uniform Sanitation Men it
becomes evident that the Court, while adhering
to its prior holdings in Spevack and Garrity with
respect to the individual rights of a public em-
ployee under the fifth amendment, recognizes the
need to protect the interests of his employer.
Under Spevack and Garrity, it is clear that the
employer may not utilize the threatened loss of
employment to coerce answers from an employee
which later may expose him to criminal sanctions.
Rather, the employee must be free to invoke the
fifth amendment privilege to stand mute. Other-
wise any statements which he makes under the
compulsion of dismissal will be immunized from
future use or derivative use in a subsequent crim-
inal prosecution of the employee.
However, in Gardner and Uniform Sanitation
Men the Court found that once the employee's
rights are so protected, an employer is not power-
less to protect itself from an employee who refuses
to account for the performance of his official
duties. Once a public servant asserts his right
under the fifth amendment to refuse to answer
his employer's demand for an accounting, the
= Id. at 283.
=Id. at 285.
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employer may discharge the employee after proper
administrative proceedings.
In light of these decisions, it would appear that
a governmental employer has two options when
confronted with a suspect employee. Which of
these options is utilized depends upon the remedy
which the employer chooses to extract from the
individual. If the criminal sanctions are chosen
as the appropriate remedy, the employer may pro-
ceed directly with a criminal prosecution without
questioning the employee.24 However, if purely
administrative remedies such as suspension or dis-
missal are sought, the employer may proceed to
demand an accounting of the employee's official
performance. Under Gardner and Uniform Sanita-
lion Men, the government may then dismiss an
employee who refuses, upon the basis of the fifth
amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, to make the demanded accounting.
What remains is the question of whether an
employee who-does give an accounting upon pain
of dismissal (and is thus immune from a criminal
prosecution based upon that testimony or its
fruits) can be discharged in an administrative pro-
ceeding upon the ground that his compelled testi-
mony reflects an improper performance of his
official duties which warrants dismissal.
While the Supreme Court has not yet rendered
an opinion resolving this question, under the
rationale of the Court's earlier decisions it would
appear that the remedy of dismissal should be
available. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit has adopted this position in up-
holding the Illinois Courts Commission removal
of an Illinois Circuit Court judge 5
The judge had been summoned to appear as a
witness before a county grand jury investigating
alleged mismanagement of the Illinois State Fair.
He appeared and refused to answer questions,
asserting his fifth amendment privilege. He was
granted full transactional immunity, reappeared
before the grand jury and testified extensively
4 If the employee is questioned, under Spevack and
Garrity, the answers which he gives under the compul-
sion of job forfeiture will be immune from direct or in-
direct use in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the
employee. While those decisions do not totally bar the
future prosecution, it would appear that the govern-
ment bears the burden of establishing that the prose-
cution is based upon evidence which is completely in-
dependent of the immunized statements of the em-
pIoyee. See Kastigar v. United States, 92 S.Ct. 1653
(1972).
25 Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1972).
concerning his business dealings with the Fair. The
grand jury later returned several indictments
charging official misconduct and conspiracy and
naming the judge an unindicted co-conspirator.
A complaint was filed with the Illinois Courts
Commission by the state Attorney General charg-
ing the judge with impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in violation of the Judicial Canons
of Ethics. Following a formal hearing at which the
transcript of the judge's immunized grand jury
testimony was admitted into evidence, the Com-
mission removed him for his conduct while a mem-
ber of the judiciary, for the circumstances sur-
rounding his testifying and for the content of his
testimony before the county grand jury.2 The
Supreme Court of the United States dismissed the
appeal from this order for want of a substantial
federal question.Y
Reviewing the dismissal of the judge's federal
civil rights suit,2 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected his con-
tention that the use of his immunized grand jury
testimony in a subsequent civil proceeding to
remove him from office subjected him to a criminal
penalty in violation of both the fifth amendment
privilege and the grant of immunity. The Court
found that the transactional immunity grant was
coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination 29 and appro-
priately protected the judge's fifth amendment
rights, and concluded:
It is clearly evident from the pertinent Court de-
cisions that a state may require a public servant
to account for the performance of his duties upon
pain of dismissal, providing the judicial officer or
state employee is accorded the full protection of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination... Here appellant has been accorded
every possible protection guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment. The hearing before the Illinois Courts
Commission afforded him a fair hearing as required
by law. He has suffered no criminal punishment
resulting from his immunized testimony nor was
26In re Napolitano, Case No. M.R. 1324 (Ill. Cts.
Comm'n. July 14, 1970).
2 In re Napolitano, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
2 Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. Ill.
1971). The suit was brought pursuant to title 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970).
2 Prior to the decision in Kastigar v. United States,
92 S.Ct. 1653 (1972), the Seventh Circuit had held that
only a grant of full transactional immunity would fully
supplant the fifth amendment privilege. In re Korman,
449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd and remanded sub.
nam. United States v. Korman, 92 S.Ct. 2055 (1972).
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the removal herein a penal aspect of criminal pro-
ceedings.3 0
The rationale of this decision would appear to
provide the final step in establishing a workable
procedure for protecting the interests of both the
individual employee and the public. Under this
procedure, the employee receives the full protec-
tion of the privilege against compulsory self-in-
crimination. At the same time, the public's in-
terest in requiring the faithful performance of
official duties by its officers and employees is safe-
guarded.
Under Gardner and Uniform Sanitalion Men
a public employee can be dismissed for refusing
to testify after having been granted immunity.
Likewise, if an employee who has been granted
immunity testifies, rather than remaining silent,
and his testimony reflects his unfitness to perform
his duties, the fifth amendment privilege should
not be a bar to his dismissal.
Although commonly referred to as the protection
against self-incrimination, the fifth amendment
literally provides that no person "shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." 0' Historically, the amendment has been
construed as applicable only where the witness
has reasonable grounds to fear future criminal
charges. Once immunity has been conferred, the
objective of the fifth amendment privilege has
been achieved by eliminating the possibility that
the witness might suffer some criminal sanction
or penalty due to his own testimony.n
0 Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279, 284 (7th Cir.
1972).
21 U.S. CoNsr. amend V (emphasis added).
2 Kastigar v. United States, 92 S.Ct. 1653 (1972);
Zicarelli v. New Jersey Comm'n of Investigation, 92
S.Ct. 1670 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52 (1964); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892).
Removal from office, however, is not a criminal
penalty involving the loss of an otherwise protected
right such as liberty or property. An employee
does not have a right to public office or employ-
ment. Indeed, the Supreme Court long ago held
that such employment is a privilege granted by
the state and is not a right secured by the federal
constitution."3
In Gardner and Uniform Sanitation Men, the
Supreme Court in effect has recognized that
the remedy of dismissal is not a criminal penalty
by allowing the discharge of an immunized em-
ployee who refuses to account for the performance
of his duties. The same reasoning applies to an
immunized witness who gives an accounting which
reflects his official misconductY' Such misconduct
is a violation of the public trust for which there
*must be some remedy. Since criminal sanctions
based upon the employee's testimony are barred,
the appropriate remedy is dismissal. The employee
thus receives the full protection of the fifth amend-
ment while the public's interest is vindicated by
the discharge of disloyal employees.
To force the public to accept and compensate
the continued services of an employee who either
refuses to account for his performance of his duties
or who is admittedly unfit is totally without sup-
port in logic and should not be required by the
Constitution.
"See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944);
Cave v. Missouri ex rel. Newell, 246 U.S. 650 (1918);
Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Wilson v.
North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586, 589 (1898).
"This conclusion has been adopted and applied by
New York as a reasonable and constitutionally per-
missible means of disciplining attorneys. See In re
Klebanoff, 21 N.Y.2d 920, 237 N.E.2d 75, 289 N.Y.S.
2d 755 (1968); Zuckerman v. Greason, 20 N,Y.2d 430,
231 N.E.2d 718, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967), cerl. denied,
390 U.S. 925 (1968); In re Selig, 32 App. Div. 2d 312
302 N.Y.S. 2d 94 (1969)- In re Ungar, 27 App. Div. 2d
925, 282 N.Y.S. 2d 158 (1967).
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